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“Nothing can be sweeter than liberty. Yet if it isn’t equal throughout, it isn’t liberty at all” 
-Cicero1 
 
“Man is truly free only among equally free men” 
-Bakunin2 
 
 
This dissertation seeks to determine whether either anarchism or republicanism can realise the ideal 
of non-domination3. Such work is of interest as adherents of these political ideologies, both 
increasingly prominent in recent years, have advanced their positions through the language of non-
domination (e.g. Clark 2007; Gordon 2008; Pettit 1997; 2012). I will argue that the republican 
approach to pursuing non-domination is, ultimately, unsuccessful. In contrast, I will show that 
anarchism, both in its ideals and its practices, is compatible with a plausible account of non-
domination.  
Anarchism, largely dormant for decades, experienced a rebirth of sorts in the 1990’s at the nexus of 
radical feminist, ecological and anti-globalisation movements (Sylvan and Sparrow 2007; Gordon 
2008). This revival only gained strength in the 21st century, seen for example in the 15-M and 
Occupy movements. While there are anarchists of many different stripes, they are united in seeking 
a stateless society absent of coercive institutions. Modern anarchism differs from its older 
instantiations in its explicit denunciation of all forms of domination, not just that enacted by the 
state (Marshall 2008, epilogue). In contrast with this, republicanism is a robustly statist theory, in 
which the state is conceived of as an active promoter and defender of the non-dominated status of 
citizens. Starting from the conception of ‘freedom as non-domination’ and how it differs from liberal 
‘freedom as non-interference’, republican authors have spawned a great deal of theory in recent 
years (see Lovett and Pettit 2009). While this revival of republicanism has largely been confined to 
academia, it has had some impact upon concrete political platforms, most notably the Zapatero 
administration in Spain (Martí and Pettit 2010). Despite their simultaneous resurgence and shared 
affinity for ‘non-domination’, comparative investigation between anarchism and republicanism has 
not been forthcoming. One of the motivations behind undertaking this dissertation, then, is to 
contribute to filling this theoretical lacuna.4 
The argument will proceed as follows. The first chapter, primarily descriptive, will outline how 
freedom as non-domination has been presented as validating republicanism. The second chapter will 
develop a critique the convincingness of this claim, arguing that the republican state cannot satisfy 
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the ideal of non-domination. The third chapter will identify and remedy the problems with 
republican account of non-domination, and show that a more fully-developed, trackable non-
domination aligns not with republicanism, but with anarchism. A brief conclusion will reflect on how 
the findings impact upon anarchism, republicanism and non-domination itself going forward. 
As he is generally regarded as the pre-eminent figure in recent republican theory (e.g. Urbinati 2012; 
Thompson 2013; Rostbøll 2015), I will present Philip Pettit’s account of how non-domination justifies 
republican institutions. Pettit has gone to great lengths to argue that his understanding of non-
domination requires for its realisation a just republican state (Pettit 2012; 2014). Given his work’s 
pertinence and pre-eminence, I hope that generalisations made regarding republicanism’s and non-
domination’s connections may not be inappropriate. Unfortunately, there is no contemporary 
anarchist author who has the same academic prestige as Pettit. Perhaps more problematic, neither 
has any anarchist set out a theory of domination in the same analytically rigorous way that Pettit 
has.5 Rather, the term tends to be used largely to encompass the diffuse complaints that anarchists 
level against society as it is currently constituted (Gordon 2008). Through identifying the weaknesses 
of Pettit’s account, though, I will formulate a conception of domination which I will show should be 
congenial to anarchists. 
It is important the note that this dissertation is not concerned with endorsing either political 
ideology. Neither do I suggest that non-domination should be our sole criterion in political matters. 
This dissertation has the more modest goal of seeing what non-domination as a coherent ideal 
would look like, and whether anarchism or republicanism can fully realise it. 
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Chapter 1: Pettit’s Non-Domination and the Republican State 
 
Philip Pettit (1997; 2012; 2014) identifies ‘freedom as non-domination’ as a republican ideal, 
informing both its traditional adherents and its institutional recommendations. In this section, I will 
summarize how Pettit argues for republicanism from the ideal of non-domination. I will, first, 
describe Pettit’s understanding of non-domination and how it differs from ‘freedom as non-
interference’. Next, I will briefly describe the two types of domination which can occur. Then, I will 
outline how mitigating these types of domination should lead us to creating or supporting a state 
which, finally, is shown to be republican in character. 
 
1.1 Freedom as non-domination 
According to Pettit, domination occurs to the extent that A has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in 
a certain range of B’s choices (Pettit 1997, 52). Interference is arbitrary when it does not track the 
interests and wishes of the agent being interfered with (Pettit 1997, 55). Pettit thinks that absence 
of domination is a better measure of freedom than non-interference, the latter conception entailing 
a number of objectionable implications. For example, non-interference implies that a slave could be 
made freer either by aligning his interests with his masters’ and behaving accordingly, or ingratiating 
himself to his master so that the master indulges the slave regardless of his actions. Pettit thinks 
such results are objectionable: freedom should neither be conditional upon subjective states nor the 
preferences of another. A slave cannot be freed through assenting to his own condition; the 
contented slave is still a slave. Allowing freedom to be attained like this is not only counter-intuitive, 
but it obscures the possibility that we could promote particular social forms as more or less 
conducive to freedom. Seeing as Pettit wants a descriptive conception of freedom which would yield 
determinate actions to be undertaken to lessen unfreedom in any given case, this will not do (Pettit 
1997; 2006)6. Pettit believes that unlike freedom as non-interference, non-domination can be just 
such a conception. Furthermore, it is an ideal which “holds out hope of making the state, even 
perhaps a welfare state, friendly to freedom” (Pettit 2001, 143). This contrasts with non-
interference, which appears to limit the extent to which we could consider ourselves free given the 
interference of the state in our lives. Recognising this possibility, however, leads to an important 
amendment as to our definition of domination. 
 
1.2 Two types of domination 
Pettit puts forward two kinds of domination; dominium and imperium. They differ with regards to 
the agents involved, as well as the interests that must be tracked for interference to be considered 
non-arbitrary. Dominium is held by private agents over others. For interference to be considered 
non-arbitrary, A’s interference must be forced to track what B’s interests or preferences are 
according to B’s own judgements (Pettit 1997, 55). Imperium is concerned with how the state (the 
public agent) wields its power over citizens. According to Pettit, state action must be “forced to track 
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the common avowable interests of its citizens, and only the common avowable interests of its 
citizens” (Pettit2001, 156). Common avowable interests are those collective provisions and 
considerations which all citizens can advocate, without embarrassment, as relevant for the state to 
concern itself with. The importance of these interests may be differently weighed by different 
individuals, but all should recognize them as relevant. There is any number of common avowable 
interests which could be admissible in policy debate, from decent living standards, to security, to a 
right to a fair trial, to an education. We will return to the concept of imperium in section 2.3. For 
now, it is enough to note that while Pettit’s definition of domination can be formulated so as to 
encompass both types, the divergent understandings of what actions count as ‘non-arbitrary’ means 
that whether an act is dominating depends upon which agents are involved, as well as what interests 
are tracked. 
There is no domination if there is neither dominium nor imperium. With regards to achieving non-
domination, it is difficult to envisage how A could eliminate dominium held by B over C, without 
actually themselves dominating B. Unless B is an unwilling dominator, any interference would seem 
to conflict with B’s interests. Of course another agent could interfere so as to reduce A’s domination 
of B, but combatting dominium with more dominium seems to lead us into an infinite regress. One 
way of avoiding this is for a group of agents, following their own avowable interests, to collectively 
maintain a public power tasked with discouraging unsanctioned private dominium. Provided it had 
enough coercive power to make its threats credible, this public power could significantly reduce 
dominium. This is the approach Pettit favours. He puts forward a statist theory, whereby the state is 
tasked with minimizing dominium, thus promoting non-domination (Pettit 1997)7. While this gives us 
a tool with which to combat one form of domination, the challenge now moves to the next level 
(argumentatively, at least; see Pettit 2012; 2014) of ensuring that the state itself does not hold 
imperium over citizens. 
 
1.3 The non-dominating state 
Given the power that the creation of such an entity entails, that the state could itself dominate 
citizens is a grave concern. Pettit recognizes two sets of institutions which reduce the likelihood of 
imperium: constitutional constraints and democratic accountability. The constraints seek to limit the 
power the state would have to dominate its citizens. These include counter-majoritarian constraints, 
a separation of powers to ensure that no one site of authority can wield excess influence, and checks 
and balances. Particularly important is the rule of law which ensures that the capacity for arbitrary 
rule by those who hold positions of power is minimized. The rule of law also relates to specifying 
that range of choice within which citizens cannot interfere with one another, ensuring their security 
in freedom. These state laws are connected to the freedom of citizens in a constitutive way; there is 
not “any temporal or causal gulf between civic institutions and the freedom of citizens” (Pettit 1997, 
81). 
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Constitutional constraints, no matter how effective they may be, will not secure non-imperium 
unless they are coupled with a way of tracking what the common avowable interests of the ruled 
are. Democratic institutions (including electoral politics) play a key role here; without reference to 
the interests of the ruled, interference can only be arbitrary. The citizens must, then, have access to 
channels through which they can control the direction of government legislation.8 Pettit sets forward 
a number of conditions which should be met for this contestatory scheme to effectively control the 
direction of government in a way that is individualized, unconditional and efficacious (Pettit 2012)9. 
Among the more significant, Pettit advocates a representative assembly that will be resistance-
averse through being subject to the workings of the electoral system. In order for such an assembly 
to operate successfully, however, it also demands an active and resistance-prone citizenry (Pettit 
2012, 173), to ensure any government will be sufficiently informed of the public’s interests and 
punished if these interests are disregarded. Citizens should also have access to channels through 
which they can contest policy or law on an individual basis.  
 
1.4 Republicanism as non-domination 
The non-dominating state outlined above greatly resembles the ideal society envisaged by 
republicanism (Haakonssen 2007). Through the clause of common avowable interests, for example, 
the people being ruled have a decisive impact upon the decisions undertaken regarding affairs of the 
public. Separation of powers and checks and balances are classically republican ideals, intended to 
ensure that individual agents or groups cannot wield power to the detriment of other parts of 
society. Freedom under the rule of law secures the free citizen, or liber, and makes his non-
dominated status a matter of common knowledge (Pettit 1997, 70-73).  
It is clear from the above that Pettit is advocating republicanism as a political theory which takes 
non-domination as its lodestar. Indeed, Pettit makes this explicit time and again; he does a thorough 
job showing that republican thinkers of the past explicitly spoke in the language of non-domination 
(Pettit 1997; 2012). The reason I have presented the development in this way is, however, faithful to 
Pettit’s attempts to show how republican institutions be justified through non-domination. In the 
next chapter, we will look in more detail at how coherent is the idea of the republican state as a 
promoter of non-domination. 
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Chapter 2: Why the Republican State Cannot Realise Pettit’s Non-Domination 
 
In this chapter I will show that Pettit’s non-domination cannot be achieved by republicanism and is 
unsuited to being tracked as an ideal. The critique of an ideal could take two forms. The first 
concerns desirability. Richardson (2006) and Krause (2013), for example, have critiqued Pettit’s 
approach for not accounting for the wrongs occasioned by impersonal aggregated actions (e.g., 
systemic prejudice, or wealthy individuals whose uncoordinated activity nonetheless shapes 
outcomes). These critiques have tended to indicate possible amendments, leaving republicanism’s 
claim to be a theory of non-domination unchallenged. This contrasts with the critique undertaken 
here, which is concerned with the ideal’s coherence. I seek to show that Pettit’s non-domination 
cannot be realised by the republican state. In the first section, I will show how the republican state’s 
democratic institutions cannot ensure that common avowable interests are satisfactorily pursued. 
The second section argues that creating or maintaining a state leads to domination of groups outside 
of the currently constituted citizenry. The third section demonstrates that non-imperium cannot be 
secured, even in theory. These three criticisms, then, all point the impossibility of considering the 
state to be non-dominating on the account given. 
 
2.1 The inequality of influence 
There are two reasons why Pettit’s account of electoral-contestatory democracy cannot ensure that 
citizens’ interests are always tracked. The first pertains to representation being suitably controlled 
by the citizenry. The second is concerned with the counter-majoritarian constraints he advances. 
Taken together, these criticisms suggest that a republican state will have imperium over its citizens.  
 
2.1.1 Representation and access to power 
The republican depends upon the electoral cycle, as well as more intangible motivations such as 
esteem and respect, to ensure that representatives are sufficiently averse to citizen resistance. 
Unfortunately, favouring a representative system of government creates for republicanism a classic 
principle-agent problem. Representatives will often have a set of interests (whether financial, 
political or moral) which diverge from the interests of citizens. Especially when considering the 
totality of issues legislated upon within any electoral cycle, depending upon resistance seems 
inadequate. For any given decision, there will be sectional interests and disparate pressures factored 
into each representative’s calculation as to how he shall act. Even if representatives seek out to 
determine the common avowable interests in every instance, they cannot be forced to do so; 
representative government neither can nor desires to remove the whim of the representative as a 
factor in decision-making. 
Furthermore, there is no way to ensure that citizens themselves advance only common, as opposed 
to sectional interests. Representatives will have incentives to cater for popular sectional interests, 
perhaps even foment them. Even if legislation were somehow forced to be framed in the common 
interest, many malign, dominating policies could still be defended in the language of common 
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interest, whether they further economic competitiveness, internal security, or other legitimate 
avowable interests. There will be many cases, then, where some common avowable interest can 
plausibly be found on either side of an argument. Even when one seems more relevant or pressing 
than another, those who are more organised or present the most credible threat or promise to 
representatives will tend to prevail, if representatives are indeed resistance-averse. The problem 
here is not just the indeterminacy of republican policy, as McMahon (2005) suggests. Rather it is that 
republicanism’s democratic procedures and its ideal of non-domination are often in direct tension: 
the citizenry will often be ruled by the whims and interests of representatives. 
 
2.1.2 Preventing democratic dominance 
Indeed, Pettit is, as are republicans generally, critical of unchecked majoritarianism; for him, it 
represents “the ultimate form of arbitrariness” (Pettit 1997, 8). Since majority voting allows one part 
of the citizenry to override the common avowable interests of the whole, Pettit argues that it should 
be supplemented with unelected agencies such as central banks, judicial bodies and electoral 
commissions; these would resolve issues ill-suited to the rigours of electoral contestation (Pettit 
2012, 232-238). The problem is that these institutions themselves can and often will be dominating. 
In fact, the very goal which democratic procedures attempt to ensure, that each person has equal 
influence, is undermined by these counter-majoritarian institutions (Bellamy 2007). The very 
decision regarding which issues should not be electorally determined would itself have to be equally 
influenced by all citizens in order to realise non-imperium; it is hard to envisage how this could be 
achieved without depending upon electoral mechanisms.  Another difficulty is that electoral 
commissions and judicial reviews will inevitably privilege the perspectives of a select few individuals 
as binding, and thus they will inevitably dominate citizens. The principle-agent problem which arises 
with representation reappears here, simply in a different location. Given that Pettit initially appeals 
to these constraints as ways through which minority groups can ensure their interests are tracked, 
he fails to recognize that this appeal simply changes the identities of those dominating and 
dominated. It does not necessarily reduce it. 
If citizens feel that the state is systematically disregarding their common avowable interests, Pettit 
admits a right to secession might be necessary to secure non-domination (Pettit 1997, 199). This is a 
good bullet to bite. However, this solution only goes so far; for a start, it seems to depend upon the 
aggrieved group in question making territorially-based claims. This will only be valid for a subset of 
the potentially dominated agents within a polity. Furthermore, given the size and significance of 
some groups, the state will not be capable of granting such a secession or procedural objection, 
even if they do feel the state is not serving their interests. It is hardly implausible to envisage, for 
example, the working class in a particular society who felt that the state was systematically 
misrepresenting or disregarding their concerns and interests. Alternatively, the wealthy in society 
could feel like the tax burden being placed upon them was particularly onerous, that their interests 
were not being tracked. It is difficult to conceive of how such groups as these could secede. Even if 
they could somehow organise themselves into a territorial zone, the state would surely fail to realise 
common avowable interests of its citizens were it to allow the secession of much of the workforce, 
or the taxable wealth of the country. One man’s secession is another man’s domination. Thus, even 
Pettit’s nuclear option is not sufficient to ensure common avowable interests are tracked. 
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From the above, it should be clear that republicanism cannot ensure that interference is non-
arbitrary. Still, these objections arise at the level of practical application. Though serious, 
republicanism could still put itself forward as advancing the ideal of non-domination, provided 
recognition that it will never be fully attainted in its implementation. A more serious challenge to 
this claim follows in section 2.2., where it will be shown that the republican state in and of itself 
precludes exclusively adhering to non-domination. 
 
2.2 The state and the scope of non-domination 
By linking the freedom of agents constitutively with the laws of the state, republicanism creates 
significant problems for the faithful adherence to non-domination. If domination can only be 
reduced through state activity, then the creation or maintenance of the state must precede reducing 
domination. If all desired reductions in dominium must be enacted through state powers, this 
doesn’t just limit the ways in which we can pursue non-domination; it limits the realisation of the 
ideal itself. There are three problems with giving the state the role of the instrument through which 
to pursue non-domination. The first is that it endorses imposition of effective, coercively-backed 
state structures upon communities which don’t have such institutions. The second is that the 
maintenance of the state allows domination of those outside its borders. Finally, the maintenance of 
states ensures the domination of future generations. Given these challenges, the state’s role as a 
promoter of non-domination is seriously undermined by its own capacity for domination. 
 
2.2.1 Non-(effective)state peoples 
Patchen Markell (2008) argues that by defining domination primarily through dominium, and 
subsequently scaling it up to imperium, Pettit loses sight of the fact that the state presents a unique 
domination-related danger of its own, in the form of ‘usurpation’. Usurpation occurs when a group 
should be the actors and architects of decisions which centrally concern them, but are not granted 
this right; instead, things are done for them, whether in their interests or otherwise10. This can seem 
a grave injustice. In the case of the foundation of the modern Australian state, for instance, the very 
enacting of a legal regime when there were already inhabitants with their own social system strikes 
us as a great wrong, and indeed an act of domination (Pateman and Mills 2007). This intuition 
would, I think, hold even if the legal regime enacted was perfectly just. Provided the social order 
replaced was not itself deeply unjust, I think we should reject the notion that communities living 
outside the power of effective states should always be freed through the imposition of state 
structures. Yet, by tying constitutively coercively-enforced state laws with freedom, this definition of 
non-domination cannot consider non-state peoples free. To see the absurdity here, picture an 
isolated community of two farmers. A grows oranges while B grows apples. They live peaceably, and, 
knowing that any serious intervention in the other person’s farm will be traced to them, they live in 
relative material security. On Pettit’s account, unless they live in a state, however, they still 
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experience a great deal of dominium at one another’s hands. These individuals will only be free if a 
state intervenes and imposes coercively enforced laws, which ensure that no theft occurs. 
Assuming that the state is the best or only promoter of non-domination fails to take into account 
that many non-state societies are characterised by what we would consider to be non-dominating 
relations (Clark 2007; Graeber 2004). In defending his state-based approach, Pettit suggests that 
through meeting the discursive standards which allow us to speak of agency (Pettit 2001) the state 
can pursue an ideal such as non-domination in a wilful way that individuals following mere social 
norms and customs cannot. However, this doesn’t take communities’ self-regulating capacities and 
abilities to resolve collective problems seriously enough (Ostrom 2011).  
Of course, Pettit makes explicit that he takes the state-system as a given, slightly affecting the cast of 
this objection. However, this in itself is not unproblematic. While the habitable earth falls within 
state borders, the map is not the territory. Where communities escape the reach of the state, or the 
state itself fails, the republican must justify state imposition. This is so regardless of whether the 
state’s failure corresponds with society’s failure, which it may not (e.g., Graeber 2007).  There are, 
then, practical repercussions for advocating the state as a necessary agent of non-domination. Even 
if we do stay at ideal theory, however, charging the state with promoting non-domination creates 
significant difficulties. 
 
2.2.2 Borders and dominated outsiders 
Pettit gives little discussion over to individuals in other states who may be dominated. He opts 
instead to discuss the non-domination of peoples within a framework of sovereign states (Pettit 
2010; 2014). State sovereignty is necessary for state’s attempts to ensure their own citizens are non-
dominated; were they easily invaded or attacked, domination would occur simply by that fact alone. 
Pettit acknowledges that a state cannot guarantee a practicable right of exit to its citizens, given that 
other states have the prerogative to maintain and organise themselves (Pettit 2009). However, Pettit 
fails to consider whether the republican state itself has a duty to accept dominated migrants. Of 
course, if an open border policy were followed, migrants would likely have less control over the state 
than current citizens, given language difficulties, lack of political connections and other factors. The 
state, then, would plausibly be further from realising non-imperium, even if the global sum of 
dominium has been lessened significantly by granting citizens in other states a practicable exit 
option. I think logic along these lines informs Pettit’s lack of engagement with open borders; 
securing that the state does not dominate its citizens outweighs duties owed to those outside the 
state. If this is a fair interpretation, we see here that non-imperium is not in all cases aligned with 
non-dominium. Given that the existence of the state is justified by the role it can play in reducing 
dominium, as noted in section 1.2, there is an ambiguity regarding how to properly weigh the 
interests of reducing dominium and reducing imperium. If the danger of imperium outweighs 
significant reductions in dominium, could the very same logic not be used to argue against the 
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state’s construction?11 Rather than being mutually supportive, non-dominium and non-imperium can 
be seen here pulling in opposite directions. 
Unfortunately, the difficulty of tracking non-domination while advocating the maintenance of the 
state does not end once the border is crossed. In the next section I demonstrate that, damningly, the 
nature of the state will ensure that all its future inhabitants will be dominated by the state’s very 
existence. 
 
2.2.3. Dominating future generations 
If to be dominated is to depend upon another agent’s will not to interfere with your choices, it 
would appear that future generations are dominated by any present republican state. If the state 
takes out a large loan in order to pay for hosting the Olympics, for example, future generations must 
ultimately pay the costs. To reject this claim, the republican could point out that the relationship 
between present and future generations is a brute fact; present generations cannot do otherwise 
but interfere, and the same could be said regarding the state’s interference. However, the state is 
not a historical necessity but rather a recent and contingent development (Spruyt 1994). There need 
not be a political agent which can and does commit those not yet born to certain undertakings, as 
the state can. Even the capacity of the state to arbitrarily interfere with their choices, as sovereign 
debt entails, means that future generations are dominated by the state. This would suggest that the 
state is unavoidably an agent of domination. Such a conclusion should be unpalatable for the 
republican; it could only be solved by either dissolving the state12 or by distinguishing between good 
and bad domination, which would leave tracking non-domination in great confusion. 
Perhaps there is a solution, whereby the state was forced to track future generations’ interests. 
However, as seen in section 2.1, a representative state cannot be forced to track the interests of its 
current citizens, let alone those not yet born. 
 
2.3 The Imperium strikes back 
The arguments of section 2.2 seem terminal for republicanisms claim to concern itself with 
promoting non-domination. However, a more modest claim could still be put forward. It could be 
argued that republicanism still realises non-domination so far as is practicable, provided we concern 
ourselves solely with the current citizens of a given state. Indeed, securing non-domination within 
these bounds is not a worthless enterprise (indeed, it is still quite an ambitious ideal). However, 
through exploring the coherence of non-imperium, I will show in this section that republicanism 
cannot satisfactorily meet even this modified aim. 
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2.3.1 Why tracking non-imperium will not work 
It is worth recalling that for Pettit, it is true by definition that the state cannot hold dominium over 
citizens. Given that the republican state is also the agent tasked with reducing dominium, and non-
imperium demands equal influence of citizens, it appears that in ensuring non-imperium is met, we 
would have done much to approximate non-domination. Equally, falling far short of non-imperium 
will, given the power of the state, mean we will fall far short of non-domination. One problem with 
this is that fully eliminating imperium is inconceivable, as Pettit himself notes (Pettit 2001, 140). 
There are huge, possibly insurmountable difficulties with regards to ensuring that every single 
individual is given equal, unconditioned and individualised control over the state. Discrepancies of 
wealth, access to government representatives, standard of education and lobbying skills vary 
significantly across the population. 
Even in ideal theory, however, we face a significant challenge; unfortunately for Pettit, non-
imperium hinges upon the same weakness which he considers fatal to the plausibility of non-
interference. Its realisation can depend simply upon subjective states in individuals. To see this, 
notice that, when we move from dominium to non-dominium, the capacity of A to interfere with B 
changes: there are less of B’s choices with which A can interfere unless explicitly authorised by B’s 
wishes. But when the state moves from imperium to non-imperium, the range of choices that the 
state can interfere with does not lessen, but only the legitimacy of the interference does. Seeing as 
the state cannot hold dominium, there is no limit to the choices which the state could interfere with, 
so long as some common avowable interest supported such interference. But this change of 
legitimacy, based on the adherence to common avowable interests, rests ultimately on citizen’s 
personal opinions and, in the case of the avowability clause, the beliefs they attribute to one 
another. If either of these two belief-sets, about my interests and about what others can avow, 
changes, can the state’s imperium suddenly become non-imperium, or vice versa? . Citizens may 
identify with the laws and policies of the state as the path of least resistance, or through inculcation, 
or through believing that others so identify. If citizen A rejects property law, but is ridiculed when he 
avows this stance in public, and reaches the conclusion that this interest is no longer avowable, has 
the state moved from imperium to non-imperium? It would seem it has. The problem with this is that 
it will also be possible at any given time for non-imperium to become imperium, without any 
institutional or political change. Hence we must recognize that the state cannot ensure non-
imperium of citizens, as the subjective judgements upon which non-imperium depends will always be 
subject to change, as well as adaption to circumstances. Much as non-interference is plagued by the 
problem of the contented slave, non-imperium seems prey to what we could call the problem of the 
contented citizen; he could be freed by simply changing his mind about his dominator. 
Based on the above conclusions, republicanism, cannot put itself forward as singularly tracking non-
domination. At best it can advocate for some of its positions through the language of non-
domination, but the ideal of non-imperium is grounded in a set of interests which are too 
indeterminate and unattainable to satisfy. In the next chapter, I will attempt to reformulate non-
domination so as to make it more trackable, and explore what realising such a notion of non-
domination would then look like. 
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Chapter 3: Non-Domination as an Anarchist Ideal 
 
The previous chapter looked at problems related to the internal coherence of Pettit’s account of 
republican non-domination. This chapter will begin from a different vantage point, indicating how a 
number of the failings highlighted in the previous chapter stem from the structural weaknesses in 
Pettit’s definition of non-domination. By noting the problematic features of Pettit’s conception, I will 
tease out what would make for a non-domination which could be successfully tracked. From this 
foundation, I will construct what is an intuitive and plausible conception of domination, one which 
could in some way be approximated with reasonable certainty. Following that, the question will be 
asked how republicanism or anarchism, both professedly concerned with the ideal, fare in faithfully 
pursuing this modified account of non-domination. I will argue that republicanism cannot be 
identified with this conception of non-domination, but at least some version of anarchism can. 
 
3.1 Towards a trackable non-domination 
Before examining whether we could track any conception of non-domination exclusively, we must 
understand why Pettit’s account is unsuited to such a task. In this section, I will attempt to diagnose 
and subsequently rectify the errors which underlie his account. 
 
3.1.1 Republicanism and the dualistic approach 
While Pettit’s attempt to build a complex institutional arrangement from a single ideal of non-
domination is impressive in its scope, it relies ultimately upon distinct interpretations as to the 
meaning of the clauses ‘arbitrary’ and ‘interest’. Hence we are left with a number of different types 
of domination. Pettit’s definition is largely informed by the desire to try to present the state as 
potentially non-dominating of individuals, in an analogous way to how free citizens do not dominate 
one another. His attempt does not augur well for others of its kind; by identifying two distinct types 
of dominating (and non-dominating) agents, Pettit is begging the question with regards whether a 
state can be non-dominating. Pettit does not explain why the state’s interference against individual 
interests should not be considered an act of dominium; his definition does all the work for him. It is 
difficult to imagine how republicanism could be justified through non-domination without some 
similar definitional dualism; the way republicanism conceives of the state’s relationship with its 
citizens is of a very different nature to the way it thinks citizens should relate to one another, which 
is different again from how the state should relate to those outside its borders. At best, 
republicanism could define itself as tracking multiple differing non-dominations, one ideal relevant 
for each type of relationship. Unfortunately, creating two different types of domination will create 
the possibility that their imperatives will often pull in opposite directions. This was seen in the case 
of non-dominium and non-imperium in section 2.2.2. In order to talk of exclusively tracking non-
domination, we would be better served by a wholly monistic account. 
 
3.1.2 Pettit and subjective states 
14 
 
Pettit’s reliance upon interests and preferences for legitimising policies and institutions as non-
dominating is deeply problematic. Non-imperium can become imperium simply through subjective 
changes entirely independent of structural or political changes of how the state interferes with its 
citizens. Seeing as domination refers to the capacity to interfere arbitrarily, the state will always be 
dominating; even if a state successfully tracked common avowable interests, these interests are 
always capable of changing. Deriving concrete institutional proposals from subjective states of the 
citizenry, then, introduces the constant possibility of domination. If a conception of non-domination 
is to be faithfully tracked, the target must be in some way exterior to the minds of the dominated, 
tied to some objectively accessible element of the social relationships being described. Only when 
we identify some externally accessible ingredient, clearly identifiable, will it be possible to talk with 
assurance as to what organisational forms would best realise the removal or increase of the element 
in question. Otherwise, we will fall into the same difficulties which plagued Pettit’s account. 
 
3.1.3 Seeking a common denominator 
A trackable conception of non-domination must, then, be a monistic account, having as its ultimate 
foundation some non-mental state. Republican theorists of non-domination all consider the capacity 
to interfere as a significant part of domination, and certainly this seems plausible. However, this is 
not enough; at all times, people in relationship with one another are capable of interference. We 
would not want to say all relationships are dominating. Rather, what marks the difference for Pettit 
is when that interference could be arbitrary (Pettit 1997). Arbitrariness occurs when the whim of an 
agent, a potential dominator’s, dictates outcomes. There are two types of account of arbitrariness, 
which specify what should justify interference in the stead of the agent’s whim. Pettit defines 
arbitrariness in a substantive sense, meaning that for non-arbitrariness, the interference must be 
justified on the terms of the agent being interfered with. Unfortunately, what could be justified on 
these terms is, much as was the case in Pettit’s reliance upon interests, far too dependent upon 
mental states for our purposes. The substantive sense of arbitrariness is indeterminate with regards 
to the institutional arrangement it would recommend. Another starting point which could be 
adopted is favoured by another republican theorist, Frank Lovett (2010), who presents a procedural 
account of arbitrariness. This stipulates that so long as any interference undertaken is in accordance 
with rules or laws clearly defined, it is not arbitrary. Neither will this do. It is to stretch our intuitions 
too far to suggest that, for example, laws written and imposed to systematically exterminate a 
people would be non-dominating, even if it could be claimed as non-arbitrary. Appealing to rules 
already written will have an inherent status quo bias, meaning that following non-domination will be 
impotent; it will simply recommend whatever institutions are already in place, regardless of what 
they might be. 
Arbitrariness as a common denominator, from the above, seems uncongenial to our task. Still, there 
must be good reason that republicans start with such a foundation. What is striking about these 
republican accounts is that it is never considered precisely what allows A’s whim to dictate 
outcomes over and against B’s. Why is A able to interfere with B, even with no good reason, or 
reason at all? Framing the issue as such, we should have a clearer picture of what is basic to 
domination; the presence of coercive capacity. Those who have credible and actionable access to 
coercive force are able to treat those without similar access with a far greater impunity than would 
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otherwise be the case. A does not need to give B reasons to carry out his will if he can instead coerce 
him. Domination, then, depends at its root upon the coercive force which enables arbitrariness. The 
more powerful agent can simply ride roughshod over the wishes of the weaker, and it is this, and not 
necessarily the interference itself, which characterises domination. The interference need not be 
arbitrary to be dominating; it is enough that the interference takes place or goes unchallenged due 
to the coercive force of the dominating agent.  
Coercive force, or its capacity, is a plausible foundation for an understanding of domination. It is 
present in much of the paradigmatic instances of domination we tend to consider, and it is relatively 
straightforward matter of assessing whether or not it is present. Of course, it will still be possible 
that reasonable disagreement could occur regarding, for example, whether a given appeal to 
coercive force is credible. If someone comes up behind you in the street, something sticking out 
beneath his jumper and says “your money or your life”, it is possible for you to think he has a loaded 
gun. It is equally possible to think he has a water pistol. Your judgement as to the facts of the matter 
will determine how you react to the appeal to coercive force. Nonetheless, by eschewing the 
language of interests, we are on firmer ground; whether an agent does have credible coercive 
capacity is something which can be discovered or inferred with a degree of certainty which cannot 
be said of interest. In the final instance, though it may be unwise to do so, one can challenge the 
coercive appeal and see if it is indeed credible. 
 
3.2 When is coercive force dominating? 
Coercive force, as the capacity which underlies the possibility of arbitrary interference, presents an 
intuitive foundation for a monistic account of domination. There is no domination without 
(potentially latent) coercive force. However, this leaves domination underspecified. In this section I 
will establish what conditions determine whether, and to what extent, domination occurs. I will 
specify three, which could be called the imbalance condition, the constitutive condition, and the exit 
condition. 
 
3.2.1 The imbalance condition 
If a poorly-treated employee threatens to strike for better conditions, intuitively it does not seem 
that he is dominating his employer. This is so despite the fact that his coercive threat may be 
credible, and indeed successful. I think the intuition behind this stems from the fact that the 
employer has a greater appeal to coercive force than the employee, even if he in this instance fails 
to activate it. This, I think, aligns with an important feature of non-domination as an ideal in that, 
unlike non-interference, non-domination tends towards equalisation of relationships, or equalisation 
of relevant capacities (Bellamy 2007; Pettit 2012). We can consider this intuitively correct even 
without a completely specified conception of domination. To see this, picture a community of 3 
individuals. If A and B each have coercive capacity x, and C has capacity x+1, C can dominate both A 
and B (taken individually, at least). To reduce A’s domination, we can raise A to x+1, or we can 
reduce C to coercive capacity x. Notice that the first option decreases domination of A, but increases 
domination of B, who is now in an inferior position to both A and C. Equalising the positions of A, B 
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and C by reducing C to coercive capacity x is the best way of ensuring non-domination. Thus, we 
should recognise the dominant agent as only those who have greater capacity of the relevant kind 
than others. Lovett (2010) calls this the imbalance of power condition. In our case, the relevant 
capacity is access to coercive force. 
 
3.2.2 The constitutive condition 
Absence of asymmetrical coercive power is insufficient as a political ideal. If only for the differences 
in physical strength between individuals, we will not be able to track this. All children would be 
dominated not only by their parents but by older children, many boyfriends and girlfriends would be 
dominated by their stronger partner, Mike Tyson would dominate us all (at least in the late 80’s). 
Why should we reject these outcomes? The plausible answer may be that the coercive force is not 
invoked in each of these cases, but this will not do either. In cases of grave asymmetries of power, 
the very existence of that power is often enough for the powerful to get what they want (Scott 
1990). To even cross the more powerful party is irrational, seeing as the outcome of a conflict will 
only have one winner. Oftentimes, the actual lack of any conflict may be the most characteristic 
feature of a relationship based upon violence (Graeber 2015). Indeed, it seems that this observation 
may contain the kernel of domination; that the imbalance of coercive force is partly constitutive of 
the relationship between the agents. To see the plausibility of this, imagine a typical relationship 
between a husband and wife. Even if the husband is more physically imposing than the wife, and is 
the breadwinner in the relationship, these facts may be incidental to the way they interact with one 
another. Either could plausibly make demands of one another irrespective of any imbalance of force 
with which to ensure those demands were carried out. Now, notice that between a master and 
slave, oftentimes neither appeal nor activation of coercive capacity is necessary for the master to 
attain his desired result; the slave recognises the power asymmetry which could be activated, and 
thus adjusts his behaviour accordingly. The relationship here is constituted by the coercive 
imbalance to the extent that it determines the respective behaviour of the agents to one another. It 
is important to note that this may come in degrees. An imbalance of coercive capacity could 
structure every individual interaction between two parties, or it may only become salient in very 
specific, particular situations. This gives us an additional criterion for a definition of domination. The 
asymmetrical coercive capacity is constitutive of the relation.  
 
3.2.3 The exit condition 
An important variable which need not, but often may, be determined by coercive capacity is the 
availability of an exit option from the dominating relationship in question. If there are no exit costs, 
it is likely that we must say there is no domination; being in the weaker position in a coercively-
constituted relationship is entirely voluntary. However, it is important to note that there will never 
be zero transaction costs involved when exiting a social relationship; this is only a theoretical 
possibility. Still, if exit costs are minimal, then the domination in question will, as a function of this, 
be minimal as well.  The degree to which an exit option is practicable will in large part determine the 
intensity of the domination felt.  
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Indeed, exit is a particularly useful mechanism for the purposes of reducing or eliminating 
domination.13 While the two other mechanisms of influence which Albert Hirschman details in his 
seminal text Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970) increase probabilities of agents attaining desired results, 
the act of exit in and of itself causally brings about the result desired. Loyalty and voice may 
contribute to improving a relationship, but if these strategies are ineffective, exit directly extricates 
one from the relationship. Exit’s efficacy makes its presence or absence of vital importance to the 
degree to which domination occurs. 
 
3.2.4 Domination: a definition 
With this specified, I think we are ready to put forward a plausible definition of domination, 
specified here:  
A dominates B if and only if  
(i) A has a greater coercive capacity than B,  
(ii) which is more or less constitutive of a relationship  
(iii) from which B has little or no practicable exit options. 
It is worth noting briefly one particular way that this definition differs from Pettit’s conception. For 
Pettit, consent is sufficient to ensure interference is non-arbitrary; so long as one’s preferences are 
followed, interference is non-dominating. However, on our account, this is insufficient to ensure 
non-domination. If a slave consents to interference, he is still dominated; he is in a relationship from 
which he cannot exit and the position he is consenting to is constituted by an imbalance of coercive 
force. The same is true of the citizen. Whether he consents to this or not is beside the point. Non-
dominating relationships are characterised not by consent, but by voluntariness, equality, or both.  
In the next section we will examine to what tracking this revised conception of non-domination 
would look like. I will argue that while republicanism cannot realise this ideal, anarchism, both in its 
ideal and its practices, can be identified with this modified account of non-domination. 
 
3.3 Realising non-domination 
Seeking to fully realise this revised account of non-domination, two approaches could be taken. The 
first is to increase exit options of dominated agents. The second is to remove inequalities of coercive 
force. Perhaps a third approach could attempt to make any coercive inequalities less constitutive of 
relationships, but it is difficult to see how this task could be undertaken. Exit costs from social 
relationships will, however, never be 0, and there is a significant subjective element with regards to 
how feasible any exit option really is. Given this, it would seem the removal of coercive inequality is 
the variable which is most capable of being followed so as to realise non-domination. With this in 
                                                          
13
 Interestingly, it is the failure of the state system to grant practicable exit options to individuals which 
demands of us to conceive of a way that the ‘voice’ of citizens can control the interference of the state (Pettit 
2009). As noted earlier, however, he is unsuccessful in showing that this can be done with sufficient efficacy to 
compensate for the dominating aspects of the state. 
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mind, we will return now to republicanism and see to what extent it seeks to minimize or remove 
domination as above defined. 
 
3.3.1 Why republicanism doesn’t realise non-domination 
Republicanism attaches a good deal of importance to coercion as something which ensures that 
citizens are secure in their freedom. While this would seem on the face of it to rule out 
republicanism as a non-dominating ideal, this conclusion is a little hasty. While it is correct that 
removal of coercive capacity would be sufficient to achieve non-domination, it is not necessary. 
What is necessary is rather the equalisation of coercive capacity; this could theoretically involve 
increasing the coercive force of certain agents. Thus coercive law does not necessarily violate non-
domination. However, republicanism still does violate non-domination through its endorsement of 
the state, which must by its nature have a radically asymmetrical coercive capacity over and against 
its citizenry. Not only is equalisation of coercive capacity not sought, but the asymmetry created is 
seen as essential for the republican project; the coercive asymmetry that holds between state and 
citizen is very much constitutive of the relationship. Finally, as discussed earlier, the republican 
cannot grant practicable exit options to its citizenry, and does not seek to do so. 
Republicanism, then, cannot be justified through the ideal of non-domination, even on this revised 
account. In the next section I will show that another political theory, anarchism, very much can be. 
 
3.3.2 The ideal of anarchism 
Anarchism, I submit, could not only endorse non-domination as an attractive ideal, but could 
consider the pursuit of non-domination as necessary and sufficient to determine anarchist ideals and 
practice. An anarchist society is defined as one wherein “no centralized body would exist to impose 
its will on the people. No political authority would be recognized as legitimate and there would be 
no coercive apparatus to enforce laws” (Marshall 2008, 625; see also e.g., Gordon 2008; Graeber 
2004; 2013). All issues and affairs would be carried out by individuals or voluntary associations. 
Underpinning this ideal is the claim that centralised forms of power embed and perpetuate much of 
the social wrongs and inequalities which mark state-based society (Clark 2007). These inequalities 
and their institutional grounding are opposed. It seems plausible, from the above, to suggest that 
anarchism could claim to realise the ideal of non-domination, as both exit options and coercive 
inequalities are accounted for. Removing the coercive apparatus which underpins the law would go 
a long way to eliminating the vast coercive inequality that holds between state and citizen. 
Membership is voluntary, thus reducing exit costs, if not removing them entirely. In the next section, 
I will examine whether there are difficulties with equating anarchism with non-domination. 
 
3.3.3 Anarchism as non-domination 
One reason that equating non-domination with anarchism might be misleading is that anarchists 
themselves do not seem to present their position through such language. This is partly true, but only 
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because anarchism generally is a tradition which is very much practice-oriented; often directing 
attention against concrete institutions of domination (predominantly the state), the underpinning 
logic is not always foregrounded. Furthermore, in more self-reflective moments, anarchists have 
identified with the ideal of attaining the greatest realisation of liberty and equality, or 
‘egalibertarianism’ (Newman 2011). This aligns with the notion of anarchism as the radicalised child 
of liberalism and socialism (Ward 1992). This goal, upon recalling non-domination’s tendency 
towards equalisation, will be seen to be the very similar, if not the very same as ‘freedom as non-
domination’.  
Another objection is that to equate anarchism with non-domination may leave anarchism 
underdetermined. Certainly, ideas supported by anarchists of different stripes such as common 
ownership, for example, cannot neatly be tied to our definition of non-domination. Yet, a world with 
non-domination and without this could still surely be considered anarchist. Thus, we could amend 
our statement by saying that a society which achieved full non-domination as a stand-alone principle 
would at least represent one kind of anarchism. This allows that anarchism denotes a broad 
constellation of social ideologies, while still recognising non-domination as their common 
denominator. Indeed, given its emphasis on voluntary association and non-coercion, perhaps 
anarchism must entail plurality of just this sort, as a political theory which should be 
underdetermined. Of course, even if one was not content to consider a society anarchist absent 
common ownership (or federalism, or mutual aid), non-domination may still be the only game in 
town. Regardless of the desirability of any of these ideals, lexical priority must be given to non-
domination. It is the sine qua non of anarchist society. Other ideals could only be advanced and 
advocated by and among non-dominated individuals, and so long as they do not conflict with the 
non-domination imperative. To suggest otherwise would seem to demand creating the very coercive 
institutions which anarchists would categorically rejected. 
 
3.3.4 Does non-domination guide anarchists? 
That non-domination fairly characterises the anarchist ideal, then, should be clear. However, this 
ideal does not tell us enough about the actions undertaken. Communist society, in its idealised final 
end, may also be non-dominating, but the stages which precede this, at least in the Marxist version, 
certainly are not. Anarchism in its practices may not be concerned with non-domination. To refute 
this, I think we can note the emphasis put upon operating in ways that are prefigurative of what an 
anarchist society would look like. This can most easily be seen in the decision-making procedures of 
anarchists groups; consonant with their rejection of coercively-enforced democracy, consensus 
process is used. Such a process must, on pain of not reaching decision, take everyone’s individual 
interests into account; seeing as everyone can block consensus, there is strong incentive to treat all 
views equally (Graeber 2013; Gordon 2008). Should this not always be possible, individuals who 
dissent from the direction others want to move the group can stand aside. Stand-asides minimize 
exit costs, thus making ensuring that the voluntary and equal capacities conditions of non-
domination are sought, if not always fully attained. 
Some would suggest that this is not solely anarchist, that many groups use similar processes. 
Anarchists would not only concede, but emphasize this point. Anarchists often argue that anarchist 
organisation can be seen within the current system, as seen in networks of friends, or amateur-
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organised football leagues, any organisation which is not constituted by any imbalance of coercive 
capacity. This is precisely what characterises a great degree of anarchist revolutionary practice; the 
recognition that anarchist society is always in existence in various places, followed by an attempt to 
expand these interstices of non-domination. This can be seen, for example, in Hakim Bey’s (1991) 
call to establish ‘Temporary Autonomous Zones’, as well as Ward’s (1992) emphasis on organising as 
much of present society as is possible through free-associational control. Non-domination can be 
said then, to guide anarchists in their practice as well as their ideal. 
Of course, joining the dots from practice to ideal may not be clear, and faithfully tracking non-
domination may not lead straightforwardly to an anarchist society. There are huge collective action 
problems; reducing one agent’s coercive capacity will make them more vulnerable to domination 
themselves, while increasing it may make others similarly vulnerable. Reasonable disagreement in 
individual instances regarding what non-domination entails is not only possible, but almost certain. 
On a broader level, however, I have shown that we do know what political theory endorsing non-
domination as an ideal should commit us to; anarchism. Social organisation which is based upon the 
principles of voluntariness and coercive equality can secure non-domination in a robust way. 
Republicanism, entailing neither principle and positing a coercively constitutive relation between 
state and citizen, is not justified by non-domination. 
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Conclusion 
 
For anarchists, the conclusions of this dissertation signify what adopting more widely the discourse 
of non-domination could contribute. Tactically, it may help orient decisions by making clear the 
types of actions that would and would not align with anarchism’s ideals. Rhetorically, it improves 
upon the awkward formulation of anarchist ideals as the maximisation of both equality and liberty, 
which makes the position sound more prone to internal tensions than it is. In non-domination, we 
get a standalone ideal which allows anarchism to present itself not as a mongrel, but as a pure 
theory with a singular, consistent vision. This is particularly important for anarchists who seek to 
remove the perceived stigma of utopianism. On the account developed here, this characterisation of 
anarchism as utopian is not quite right: while there are difficulties (both epistemic and tactical) for 
achieving anarchism, the ideal sought is clear, as is the direction of the pursuit.  
If anarchism, and not republicanism, is truly the political theory of non-domination, should avowed 
republicans convert en masse to anarchism? Not necessarily, for two different reasons. The first is 
that anarchism may still be considered too unrealistic or demanding in the collective action 
problems it must seek to resolve. One could hold that we would be better served focusing our 
energies on improving and utilising the political institutions we already have, rather than trying to 
dismantle or overcome them. This is tied with the second reason that republicans could coherently 
stay republicans, which is that they are committed to other ideals which can justify the institutional 
arrangement which they favour. They must probe and make explicit the other ideals to which they 
adhere, so as to more persuasively argue for their position. Indeed, this self-reflection may prove a 
blessing in disguise; the case for republicanism could be made more robust through an earnest 
engagement with the valuable contributions which (to give some tentative suggestions) security, 
political and institutional stability, large-scale organisational forms, even incrementalism as a 
political methodology make. Indeed, the republican can take solace in the very real possibility that 
republican non-domination appears as an attractive ideal through the very political arrangements 
which it has been claimed to underpin, as opposed to the other way around; were the forms 
themselves undesirable, neither they nor the ideal underpinning them would be endorsed. 
With regards to non-domination itself, the definition herein developed improves upon previous 
efforts by making more concrete the way in which it could be tracked and realised. By no means is 
this to say that it is the only ideal worth pursuing; many others could be volunteered without even 
giving it much thought. It is, however, a valuable ideal, particularly with regards to how human 
relationships should be constituted. There is more work to be done, for sure. In particular, the 
interaction between types of coercive force which are relevant needs to be developed. How we 
could further our understanding of just when coercive imbalance is sufficiently constitutive of a 
relationship to be considered dominating must also be explored. But as is the case in so many 
philosophy dissertations, these issues are beyond the scope of this essay. 
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Martí, José Luis, and Philip Pettit. A Political Philosophy in Public Life: Civic Republicanism in 
Zapatero's Spain. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. 
McMahon, Christopher. “The Indeterminacy of Republican Policy.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, 
no. 1 (2005), 67-93. 
23 
 
Newman, Saul. “Postanarchism: a Politics of Anti-Politics.” Journal of Political Ideologies 16, no. 3 
(2011): 313-327. 
Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Pateman, Carole, and Charles W. Mills. Contract and Domination. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007. 
Pettit, Philip. "A Republican Law of Peoples." European Journal of Political Theory 9, no. 1 (2010): 
70-94. 
Pettit, Philip. "The Determinacy of Republican Policy: A Reply to McMahon." Philosophy Public 
Affairs Philosophy & Public Affairs 34, no. 3 (2006): 275-83. 
Pettit, Philip. “Law and Liberty.” In Law and Republicanism, edited by Samantha Besson and José 
Luis Martí. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 39-59. 
Pettit, Philip. A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
Pettit, Philip. Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World. New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 2014. 
Pettit, Philip. On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997. 
Richardson, Henry S. “Republicanism and Democratic Injustice.” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 
5, no. 2 (2006): 175-200. 
Rostbøll, Christian F. "Non-domination and Democratic Legitimacy." Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 18, no. 4 (2015): 424-39. 
Scott, James C. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990. 
Spruyt, Hendrik. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
Sylvan, Richard with Robert Sparrow. “Anarchism.” In Companion to Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, 2nd Edition  edited by Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas W. Pogge. Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007. 257-284. 
Thompson, Michael J. "Reconstructing Republican Freedom: A Critique of the Neo-republican 
Concept of Freedom as Non-domination." Philosophy & Social Criticism 39, no. 3 (2013): 277-98. 
Urbinati, Nadia. "Competing for Liberty: The Republican Critique of Democracy." American 
Political Science Review 106, no. 03 (2012): 607-21. 
24 
 
Ward, Colin. Anarchy in Action. London: Freedom Press, 1992. 
